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PRIVATIZING PROFESSIONALISM:
CLIENT CONTROL OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS
Christopher J. Whelan* & Neta Ziv**
INTRODUCTION
The nature of the lawyer-client relationship is “one of the most contested
areas of professional ethics.” 1 In the corporate client “hemisphere” 2 of
legal practice, and especially in the global marketplace, studies have
suggested that the traditional model of the lawyer, as an independent
professional, exercising professional judgment, has all but disappeared. At
best, there is “commercialized professional[ism]”; 3 at worst, lawyers are
“more akin to a cog in a machine.”4
Deborah Rhode, for example, has argued that law firms have become
tainted with commercialism, to the detriment of their lofty professionalism. 5
Robert Gordon has noted that the client-centered focus of lawyers is in
danger of reducing their public professional obligations to virtually zero:
Lawyers have come to feel genuinely affronted and indignant when any
authority tries to articulate a public obligation of lawyers that may end up
putting them at odds with clients. We have no public obligations, they
* Associate Director, International Law Programmes and Member, Faculty of Law,
University of Oxford; Visiting Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School of
Law; Barrister, 3 Paper Buildings, Temple, London.
** Director, The Cegla Clinical Law Programs, The Buchmann Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv
University.
We are grateful to Dan D. Sandman, Thomas E. Spahn (McGuire Woods), Nick
Krebs, and the other lawyers in the United States, United Kingdom, and Israel who agreed to
be interviewed; to Matthias Kaseorg, Penn Clarke (W&L), and Oded Bakal (TAU) for their
research assistance; to Christine Parker for her comments on an earlier draft; and to the other
participants at the Fordham University School of Law’s colloquium on Globalization and the
Legal Profession, held at Fordham University in October 2011. Unless otherwise indicated,
the interviews cited in this Article were conducted by us on a confidential basis between
February and October 2011. We have confirmed the veracity of the interviewees’
statements, which have been lightly edited by the Fordham Law Review.
1. ANDREW BOON & JENNIFER LEVIN, THE ETHICS AND CONDUCT OF LAWYERS IN
ENGLAND AND WALES 178 (2d ed. 2008).
2. See generally JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE
SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 127–69 (1982) (chapter on “The Hemispheres of the Legal
Profession”).
3. GERARD HANLON, LAWYERS, THE STATE AND THE MARKET: PROFESSIONALISM
REVISITED 123 (1999).
4. BOON & LEVIN, supra note 1, at 187. See generally MARC GALANTER & THOMAS
PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991)
(analyzing the organizational structure and incentives for lawyers in large law firms).
5. DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 9 (2000).
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claim; we are private agents for private parties . . . our loyalties to clients
must be absolute and undivided. 6

Gordon refers to this as a libertarian ideology that “privatizes the lawyer’s
role.” 7 In this context, “[i]ndependence from the client . . . is generally not
a legitimate aspiration for the bar.”8 In place of independence, there is a
moral interdependence between lawyer and corporate client.9
The question then arises: what kind of ethics do large corporate clients
want of their lawyers? 10 No one doubts the commercial pressures of legal
practice in general and corporate legal practice in particular, 11 and the
impact these can have on lawyers’ ethical conduct. One possibility is that
corporations “want litigators who will press for every advantage and
counselors who will exploit every regulatory loophole, not lawyers who feel
bound by nebulous duties that supposedly arise from being an officer of the
court.” 12 But it is possible to envisage corporate clients that might be
willing to subordinate their immediate commercial interests to the lawyers’
professional responsibilities, or who see “ethical behavior as important to
their long-term commercial stability and . . . profitability.” 13
In order to probe into the relationship between global corporations and
their lawyers, we have examined clients’ Outside Counsel Guidelines (OC
Guidelines or Guidelines), or other formal terms of engagement, as well as
informal norms that shape the relationship between lawyers and clients.
Our main finding is that corporate clients, and in particular global
corporations, are gaining influence and control over lawyers’ practices at a
scope significantly above and beyond what had been customary in the
past. 14 In particular, norms relating to lawyers’ practice that had formerly
been under the domain of professional and state bodies, or left to the
discretion of lawyers and their firms, are increasingly incorporated into
6. Robert W. Gordon, A Collective Failure of Nerve: The Bar’s Response to Kaye
Scholer, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 315, 320 (1998).
7. Id. at 321.
8. Evan A. Davis, The Meaning of Professional Independence, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1281, 1281 (2003).
9. See Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and
Their Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 507, 520 (1994).
10. ADRIAN EVANS, ASSESSING LAWYERS’ ETHICS: A PRACTITIONERS’ GUIDE 16 (2011).
11. See Anthony T. Kronman, Professionalism, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 89,
90 (1999) (“[A] new and aggressive culture of commercial values . . . is spreading through
the profession as a whole.”). See generally MILTON C. REGAN JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE
FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER (2004) (analyzing the divergence of a lawyer’s
commercial interests and ethical obligations).
12. Milton C. Regan, Taxes and Death: The Rise and Demise of an American Law
Firm, in STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS AND SOCIETY: LAW FIRMS, LEGAL CULTURE, AND LEGAL
PRACTICE 107, 108–09 (Austin Sara ed., 2010) .
13. EVANS, supra note 10, at 16.
14. Research by Robert Eli Rosen observes changes in corporate clients’ structures,
management styles, and culture as the locus from which to analyze lawyers’ practices. See
Robert Eli Rosen, We’re All Consultants Now: How Change in Client Organizational
Strategies Influences Change in the Organization of Corporate Legal Services, 44 ARIZ. L.
REV. 637 (2002). We join this approach, while focusing mainly on material that addresses
lawyers’ conduct—namely, OC Guidelines—though in the broader context of corporate
clients’ altering ethics and policies.
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“guidelines,” “procedures,” “codes of conduct,” “manuals,” or “best
practices” memoranda, which lawyers are expected to follow.
The topics incorporated in the guidelines vary to a great extent. They
include instructions that by tradition have been part of bilateral negotiations
between lawyers and clients, namely fees and billing terms; but they also
incorporate directives on topics that have constituted the core of lawyers’
ethics, such as conflicts of interest, client confidentiality, and professional
conduct during litigation and discovery proceedings. They also relate to
matters that have been part of law firms’ business prerogatives, such as
workplace employment diversity or “work-life balance/family friendly”
employment policies. In some instances, we have identified guidelines that
require lawyers to act as “gatekeepers” for the client, and to report
misbehavior of corporate officers to management. Many codes and
guidelines include an expectation that their lawyers act “ethically” and with
“integrity,” an interesting point in and of itself, as one would think that this
requirement ought to be obvious. These guidelines and norms are not the
outcome of private negotiation between lawyer and client, but are imposed
unilaterally upon lawyers retained by the corporate client. Thus they are
evolving into a new kind of regulation, this time by private clients, hence
the notion of “privatizing professionalism.” We are interested in learning
about this form of control and how it is affecting the practice of lawyers,
including law firm structure, the management of lawyers’ multiple loyalties
(to clients, third parties, and others), their relationship with professional
bodies (law societies) and the state, and their claim for professional
autonomy.
This Article demonstrates that in some cases the guidelines clearly
protect the direct and immediate interests of the client, as recognized in
conventional corporate law and lawyers’ ethics. In other words, lawyers are
expected to maximize the interests and benefits of their corporate clients
(financial, reputational, etc.), regardless of potential adverse consequences
to others. But there are also rules that do not strictly follow this rationale.
These include workplace diversity requirements in outside counsel law
firms, prohibitions on using obstructive and coercive tactics in litigation,
the duty to protect the integrity of the justice system, the duty to consider
and favor negotiation and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) over
contentious adversarial strategies, and the general duty to act “ethically.”
In order to discuss this development, we draw upon two theoretical
paradigms and bodies of literature: (1) the regulation of the legal
profession, which we suggest that OC Guidelines should be considered a
part of; and (2) the changing roles of inside versus outside counsel in
corporate practice. We then present an overview of our research findings,
which are based on a review of over twenty sets of Guidelines (summarized
in an Appendix), and interviews with twenty in-house and outside lawyers
and general counsel in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel.
Following this, we set out some of the main elements of Walmart’s Outside
Counsel Procedures, since they illustrate just how detailed and ambitious
such procedures can be. Finally, we argue that OC Guidelines constitute a
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form of “privatized professionalism,” and consider some of the implications
of this conceptualization.
I. LAWYERS’ REGULATION
The changing nature of lawyers’ regulation has received much attention
in recent years. Some have addressed the topic prescriptively and
normatively—asking about the best arrangement for lawyers’ regulation.15
Others have been descriptive—telling us about past, current, and future
arrangements that will govern lawyers’ terms of professional engagement.16
Comparative perspectives have tied particular arrangements to the
historical, cultural, and political conditions of law and lawyers in a
particular society and country, 17 as part of globalization and the changing
role of the market and the state.18 The topic has been related to
developments in technology 19 and changes in legal culture.20
Whatever the methodology, this research most often discusses the
question of lawyers’ regulation through a paradigmatic dichotomy of state
regulation versus self-regulation. Under this paradigm, the field of
lawyers’ regulation is confined to a continuum: on one end, there is a
strong system of autonomous regulation by the profession’s institutions
(mainly law societies but also courts), while at the other end, the profession
is regulated by state bodies, including legislatures (federal and state),
administrative agencies, and the civil courts.

15. See, e.g., Eli Wald, Should Judges Regulate Lawyers?, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 149
(2010); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992).
16. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 14; Eli Wald, Federalizing Legal Ethics, Nationalizing
Law Practice, and the Future of the American Legal Profession in a Global Age, 48 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 489 (2011); Alice Woolley, Rhetoric and Realities: What Independence of
the Bar Requires of Lawyer Regulation (July 3, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1877884.
17. See, e.g., 1 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE COMMON LAW WORLD (Richard L. Abel &
Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 2005); 2 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD (Richard L.
Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 2005); CHRISTINE PARKER, JUST LAWYERS: REGULATION AND
ACCESS TO JUSTICE (1999); Susan Saab Fortney, Tales of Two Regimes for Regulating
Limited Liability Law Firms in the US and Australia: Client Protection and Risk
Management Lessons, 11 LEGAL ETHICS 230 (2009); David McQuoid-Mason, Access to
Justice in South Africa: Are There Enough Lawyers?, 22 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 213
(2003); Amit M. Sachdeva & Sachin Sachdeva, The Indian LLP Law: Some Concerns for
Lawyers and Chartered Accountants, 92 SEBI & CORP. L. 1 (2009); Neta Ziv, Regulation of
Israeli Lawyers: From Professional Autonomy to Multi-institutional Regulation, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 1763 (2009).
18. See generally Carole Silver, Regulatory Mismatch in the International Market for
Legal Services, 23 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 487 (2003); Laurel S. Terry, The European
Commission Project Regarding Competition in Professional Services, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. &
BUS. 1 (2009); Christopher J. Whelan, The Paradox of Professionalism: Global Law
Practice Means Business, 27 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 465 (2008).
19. See generally RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE
OF LEGAL SERVICES (2009) (describing how emerging technologies have radically changed
the legal field).
20. See generally Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public
Opinion, Installment Two: How Far Should Corporate Attorneys Go?, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1119 (2010) (analyzing how public opinion is shaping legal culture).
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David Wilkins mapped the regulatory systems in the United States. 21
These mechanisms shift from “self-regulatory” schemes (disciplinary
proceedings) via administrative control, oversight (institutional), and courtbased norm setting (liability controls) to legislative interventions. Fred C.
Zacharias has argued that the claim for self-regulation is a “misnomer,” and
that the legal profession in the United States had always been heavily
regulated by a variety of state and federal institutions.22 When John
Leubsdorf claimed that legal ethics are “falling apart,” he meant that
regulating lawyers’ conduct is not done by “the state or states in which the
lawyer is acting,” but also by “state and federal legislators, administrators,
and others.” 23 Thus the state has been a central part of this discussion.
Since the mid-1990s, literature on regulation has embarked upon the
implications of globalization and world capitalism as overarching,
hegemonic ideologies that affect regulation in general, and that of the legal
profession in particular. From this direction, lawyers have increasingly
been exposed to pressures to renounce their special status and privileges, as
their professional knowledge is not considered different from that of any
other profession. 24 Lawyers are being treated as any other “service
provider”; in fact, “the service providers paradigm” is replacing the
professional paradigm. 25 As Laurel Terry describes, this shift has been
induced by the European Union, NAFTA (through the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative), the 1994 General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS), and the World Trade Organization. 26 Their shared position has
been that lawyers ought to be regulated under the general “disciplines” (i.e.,
market regulation) of service providers, with no distinctive regulatory
status. 27 Although not states in the traditional structure, these institutions,
agreements, and fora are heavily state-dominated. This approach was met
with objection from bar associations and law societies, including the
American Bar Association (ABA), the Council of Bars and Law Societies
of Europe (CCBE), and the Japan Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA).28
These organizations were particularly concerned with the approach that
addresses lawyers’ regulatory arrangements in tandem with non-lawyer
service providers. 29
21. See Wilkins, supra note 15, at 805–09 (discussing mechanisms for addressing
lawyers’ misconduct).
22. Fred C. Zacharias, The “Self-Regulation” Misnomer, in REAFFIRMING LEGAL
ETHICS: TAKING STOCK AND NEW IDEAS 188 (Kieran Tranter et al. eds., 2010); see also Fred
C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147 (2009).
23. John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 959 (2009).
24. Laurel S. Terry, The Future Regulation of the Legal Profession: The Impact of
Treating the Legal Profession as “Service Providers,” 2008 J. PROF. LAW. 189; John Flood,
Will There Be Fallout from Clementi? The Global Repercussions for the Legal Profession
After the UK Legal Services Act 2007, (Miami-Fla. Eur. Union Ctr. Jean Monnet/Robert
Schuman Paper Series, Volume 8, No. 6, 2008) available at http://www6.miami.edu/
EUCenter/publications/FloodLong08ClementiEdi.pdf; see also Whelan, supra note 18.
25. Terry, supra note 24, at 189.
26. Id. at 190–93.
27. Id. at 194.
28. See id. at 193.
29. See id.
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Thus, from a state-based or a transnational viewpoint, the discourse about
the changing nature of lawyers’ regulation has for the most part meant a
reallocation of power between the profession and the state.30 In this
Article, we shift the gaze from the state–self-regulation dichotomy to global
and multinational corporations. We ask if and how these “new regulators”
are shaping (de facto or potentially) “the business of law,” and what their
impact is on lawyers’ professionalism.
At this point, it is appropriate to ask whether the guidelines imposed by
corporations upon their lawyers are in fact a regulatory regime, rather than a
contract, similar to agreements that lawyers have always entered into with
clients. Contracts are often a type of regulation; indeed, they are just one
example of “private lawmaking.” 31
From a theoretical perspective, we can employ Julia Black’s definition of
regulation as “the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of
others according to defined standards or purposes with the intention of
producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes, which may involve
mechanisms of standard setting, information—gathering and behavior—
modification.” 32 This definition views regulation as de-centered, extending
beyond state institutions, and creating a variety of forms and relationships
between civil society, state, and private (market) actors. Under this
definition, an entity can be both a regulator and regulated, depending on the
context. 33 Thus these OC Guidelines need to be understood not just as a
private arrangement between two individual parties who wish to settle on
their terms of engagement.
Looking at OC Guidelines and codes of conduct through this lens, we
may be facing multiple regulatory systems applying to lawyers
simultaneously. Inasmuch as these documents address issues that are also
governed by state disciplinary rules or law societies’ ethical codes, they
may contain different standards of behavior than the “ordinary” rules. At
times, they set heightened standards toward clients as compared with
traditional ethical codes; at others, they complement them with duties
toward non-clients that are often absent from the traditional codes. We
30. See Christopher J. Whelan, Ethics Beyond the Horizon: Why Regulate the Global
Practice of Law?, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 931 (2001). One variation of this state–
profession dichotomy is the work of John Flood on global law firms and their response to the
profession–state re-division of power. Flood argues that global law firms have become so
powerful that they are out of regulatory reach of both the state regulator and the professional
law society (or other professional institution). Instead, they develop internal self-regulatory
mechanisms and ethics committees. This is yet another manifestation of soft law, a
voluntary code of conduct similar to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) self-governance
systems. See John Flood, The Re-landscaping of the Legal Profession: Large Law Firms
and Professional Re-Regulation, 59 CURRENT SOC. 507 (2011).
31. Michael J. Powell, Professional Innovation: Corporate Lawyers and Private
Lawmaking, 18 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 423 (1993).
32. Julia Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, 27 AUSTL. J. ON LEGAL PHIL. 1, 26
(2002).
33. A corporate client defines norms that apply to itself, thus acting as a regulatee
(although these norms are “soft” and not binding), and at the same time it applies norms
upon others, acting as a regulator.
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believe what we are witnessing is indeed a new model, often labeled as
“private regulation.” 34 Private regulation is an amalgam of norms
originating in private corporations that aims to set behavioral standards in
an array of contexts. Tim Bartley describes this system as encompassing
“coalitions of nonstate actors,” who take part in a comprehensive web of
norm-setting activities. 35 They “codify, monitor, and in some cases certify
[commercial] firms’ compliance with labor, environmental, human rights,
or other standards of accountability.” 36 Global corporations reacting to
these norms (often in the name of social responsibility) enter into
transactions within transnational “chains of supply,” turning private
regulation into a transnational phenomenon. 37 Due to the lack of formal
regulatory capacity at the global level, this situation calls for new forms of
“global governance.” 38 Hence codes of conduct imposed upon suppliers
are part of this global governance regime and form a system of private
regulation. 39 As we have seen, lawyers have come to be treated as other
“suppliers”; thus, their codes also form part of this new private regulatory
system.
II. INSIDE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL
Since the 1990s, the division of professional labor between inside and
outside counsel has been altered significantly. 40 Tasks once performed by
outside law firms are increasingly under the responsibility of inside
counsel. 41 Corporate counsel often “micro-manage” outside counsel.42
Their once-inferior status has been elevated and they now allocate, guide,
control, and supervise the work of outside counsel. 43 The new role of
inside counsel has spurred intensive deliberations about their professional
independence and power vis-à-vis corporate clients.44
34. See generally Ronen Shamir, Socially Responsible Private Regulation: World
Culture or World-Capitalism?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 313 (2011) (analyzing the
phenomenon of corporate social private regulation in light of globalization).
35. Tim Bartley, Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization: The Rise of
Transnational Private Regulation of Labor and Environmental Conditions, 113 AM. J. SOC.
297, 298 (2007).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Miles Kahler & David A. Lake, Globalization and Governance, in
GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN TRANSITION 1 (Miles
Kahler & David A. Lake eds., 2003).
39. See id.
40. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74 FORDHAM
L. REV. 955 (2005); Carl D. Liggio, The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY
L.J. 1201 (1997); Omari Scott Simmons & James D. Dinnage, Innkeepers: A Unifying
Theory of the In-House Counsel Role, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 77 (2011).
41. See generally Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and
Entrepreneurs: Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 457 (2000) (identifying the ideal roles for inside counsel in corporations).
42. Interview with Thomas E. Spahn, Partner, McGuire Woods LLP (June 19, 2011).
43. Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 41, at 457–58.
44. See generally DeMott, supra note 40; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethical Dilemmas of
Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1011 (1997); Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: ReSituating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983 (2005); Suzanne Le
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As inside counsel gain more relative power and influence, their
relationship with outside counsel is altered. In the past, general counsels
“have shown remarkably little interest in the internal management or
practices of the law firms they employed.” 45 However, Suzanne Le Mire
and Christine Parker discuss the growing evidence that corporations with
large in-house legal departments convey high ethical expectations of their
external lawyers:
In-house counsel closely supervise and monitor the services provided by
external lawyers with a particular focus on ensuring that external lawyers
fulfil their ethical responsibilities to the corporate client . . . . The
combined market power and technical legal expertise of corporate clients
with in-house legal departments means that they have the capacity to hold
their external lawyers accountable to ethical responsibilities more
consistently and reliably than can the clients of sole practitioners and
lawyers in smaller law firms. 46

This means that it is essentially the corporate client that sets the tone for the
ethical behavior of its lawyer: the higher the ethical standard of the client,
the better the chances that its lawyers behave ethically.
This is hardly surprising. The harder challenges come about when the
officers of the corporate client wish to act unethically. The question then
becomes whether lawyers’ professional core values and ethical obligations
can impede upon actual or proposed misconduct, and prevent misdeeds. As
the cases of Enron and other corporate scandals have shown, lawyers have
not been able or willing to thwart their powerful clients, and in the most
difficult and disturbing circumstances, they either did not play this
buffering role or failed in their attempts to do so.47
In the discussion of lawyers’ role in corporate ethics, the focus of inquiry
had been the place of lawyers’ professional independence and public
commitments in preventing misconduct.48 In other words, it was assumed
that clients would “behave badly” and the question had been if lawyers had
enough power, independence, awareness, consciousness, will, tools, and
support to act according to their acclaimed professional ideals.
Our inquiries have provided an opportunity to examine these
relationships from a different angle. We have identified some corporate
clients that have adopted a policy of “good social behavior” and wish to

Mire & Christine Parker, “Keeping It In-House: Ethics in the Relationship Between Large
Law Firm Lawyers and Their Corporate Clients Through the Eyes of In-House Counsel, 11
LEGAL ETHICS 201 (2008).
45. David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate
Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067, 2111 (2010).
46. Le Mire & Parker, supra note 44, at 202. Note, though, that large corporate clients
use both large and small law firms. Indeed, their influence on the latter may be even greater
than on the former.
47. See Christopher J. Whelan, Some Realism About Professionalism: Core Values,
Legality, and Corporate Law Practice, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1067, 1075–81 (2007).
48. See generally ENRON AND OTHER CORPORATE FIASCOS: THE CORPORATE SCANDAL
READER (Nancy B. Rapoport et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009) (detailing the roles of lawyers in major
corporate scandals).
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impose it upon outside counsel. The apparatus through which this is done
is the inside counsel. In some cases, inside counsel draft the corporation’s
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policy (including OC Guidelines)
and retain a great deal of power over outside law firms. Inside counsel are
usually familiar with the culture of large law firm practice, and thus become
the central means of enforcing the corporation’s CSR policy.
In sum, in the context of “corporate private regulation,” the role of inside
counsel becomes vital in ensuring compliance with the corporate client’s
norms, and requires new structural and substantive positioning vis-à-vis
outside counsel. 49
III. CLIENT GUIDELINES, PROCEDURES, AND REQUIREMENTS
OF OUTSIDE COUNSEL
OC Guidelines, requirements, and procedures are commonplace, 50 but
there is a wide variety in terms of their scope, content, and form. Some OC
procedures are lengthy; others not. Some corporate counsel took the view
that “no one reads” long, detailed guidelines; others stated that guidelines
are “a living document with genuine expectations.”51 In this section, we
present central findings of OC Guidelines and other requirements imposed
by clients on their lawyers. These findings are based on the following
sources: a review of OC Guidelines found on the internet; a review of
guidelines and documents provided to us through direct contacts and/or
interviews with in-house counsel, outside counsel, and officers of
corporations; and complementary information obtained in interviews of
those mentioned above.
We cover all of these sources because they provide a more complete
picture of the normative landscape we are exploring. Formal guidelines
may understate (or overstate) what the company is actually doing. The
guidelines might set a broad standard, and include directives such as “strive
to hire minority lawyers” or “committed to the highest ethical standards,”
which on their face are too general to be enforced. Several OC Guidelines
and corporate general codes of conduct refer to following the spirit rather
than just the letter of the law; at times, they are backed by mechanisms to
implement these objectives.
51F

52F

49. In this Article, we are not looking at the role of so-called independent “standby”
board counsel, that is, counsel hired specifically to be responsible to board members or an
audit committee. Cf. 2006 NAT’L DIRS. INST., THE INCREASING ROLE OF INDEPENDENT
“STANDBY” BOARD COUNSEL.
50. Rees W. Morrison, Hot-Button Issues in Outside Counsel Guidelines, N.Y. L.J., Jan.
12, 2009, at 24 (“All but the smallest law departments have guidelines that they distribute to
outside counsel.”).
51. Interview with General Counsel and Head of Risk Management, London law firm
(Sept. 2011) (it is notable that law firms designate positions of this sort).
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A. Processes and Means of Applying Guidelines and Requirements
upon Outside Counsel
As demonstrated in the Appendix, some corporations have formal, wellestablished guidelines or codes of conduct applying to lawyers retained as
OC. However, the process under which law firms are retained as outside
counsel is also telling of the reworking of conventional patterns of the
lawyer–corporate client relationship. Interviews with corporations and
clients reveal that retention of a law firm is often conducted as part of the
The European Bank for
corporation’s procurement activities.52
Reconstruction and Development, for example, publishes information about
“outside counsel services” under the following hierarchical rubrics:
“Working with us/Procurement/Outside Counsel services.” 53
In the most blatant expression of this trend, lawyers in one U.K. firm
stated that the same corporate department purchases “loo rolls” (toilet
paper) and legal services.54 Some corporations utilize tenders or Request
for Proposals for outside counsel, which then become the formal documents
under which lawyers would be regulated; others initiate contacts with law
firms, asking them to submit proposals to be retained by the corporation.
Under these procurement procedures, law firms may be required to provide
information about the firm and its employees.55 The point we would like to
underscore is that whether through prescribed outside counsel guidelines,
formal procurement procedures, or business negotiations, the terms of
retention of lawyers’ services are being standardized and treated similar to
other procurements of goods or services. Conditions of retention are then
converted into the new regulatory scheme that applies to lawyers.
B. Obtaining Information About Law Firms’ Business and Employees
During the procurement process, and often as part of their reporting
duties, law firms are required to provide detailed information about their
business affairs, staff, administrative practices, and employment policies.
This is a trend to which some law firms are not easily getting accustomed,
and some consider it to be an unreasonable intrusion into their business
prerogatives. In our reviews of OC Guidelines and interviews of inside and
outside counsel we have come across the following data that law firms are
asked to provide as a condition for working with the corporate client: staff
and structure (partners, associates, paralegals); profitability and revenues;
employees’ background check for criminal and credit records; permission to
conduct drug testing of employees (upon hiring and subsequently at client
request); employee computer security conduct requirements (shut down and
52. Id.; Interview with General Counsel at an Israeli company that develops electro-optic
systems (Mar. 2011).
53. Outside Counsel Services, EUR. BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV.,
http://www.ebrd.com/pages/workingwithus/procurement/ocs.shtml (last updated Feb. 16,
2011) (OC services appear in the same rubric as project procurement, consultancy services,
and corporate procurement).
54. Interview with London law firm partner (Sept. 2011).
55. See infra Part III.B.
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lock computers); financial auditing; the duty to award full credit for all
corporate client’s work coming into the firm to a designated “Relational
Partner” (which must be selected from a “diverse pool” of candidates);56
the general ethical record of the firm and its lawyers (even if not related to
work with the corporate client); employees’ freedom to join trade unions;
environmental policies; limitations on working hours, including those of the
lawyers; 57 information security and IT auditing; and whistleblowing
policies and protection.
Not all corporations impose all of these requirements, but there is a
definite pattern whereby corporate clients become more involved and obtain
a higher level of control over many aspects of law firm conduct. While in
the past, corporate client control had been concerned only with the legal
services it received from its lawyers (through billing arrangements and the
like), this is changing. Corporate clients are involving themselves in areas
of operation that are only remotely connected to the law. Some of them can
be associated with the client’s interest, such as information security or law
firm auditing. Others seem to originate from the client’s CSR (or other)
policies, such as recycling requirements or freedom to join trade unions.
Still others can fulfill both criteria, such as diversity and work-life balance
requirements.
C. Length, Content, and Scope
At one end of the spectrum, we found lengthy documents containing
detailed requirements in many areas of operation: billing, fee arrangements
and control over expenses, minute activity reporting and detailed
coordination requirements with inside counsel, data collection on law firm
practices, information security instructions, litigation policy, media
contacts, diversity requirements, conflicts of interests, and confidentiality.
Examples of this include Walmart and Bank of America. 58 At the other
end, there were very brief guidelines for outside counsel, running just two
or three pages, intended to be “user-friendly” and practical, such as a twopage laminated document that could be placed on everyone’s desk. Such
guidelines, issued for example by a multinational beverage company and

56. See infra Part III.C.
57. See infra Part III.J.
58. Interestingly, some non-corporate clients also have OC Procedures. One example is
the State of New Jersey Department of Law & Public Safety. DEP’T OF LAW & PUB. SAFETY,
OFFICE OF N.J. ATT’Y GEN., OUTSIDE COUNSEL GUIDELINES (2011); see also infra Appendix
(listing the State of Minnesota and Maricopa County College as non-corporate clients with
OC requirements). New Jersey’s OC are expected to represent the state “with integrity,
professionalism, and a sense of urgency in resolving legal problems,” and in accordance
“with the highest ethical standards.” DEP’T OF LAW & PUB. SAFETY, supra at 1, 4. The
guidelines deal with several ethical issues, including conflicts of interest, confidentiality,
litigation and advice matters, contingency fee litigation, pleadings and motions, settlement,
and ADR. It may well be that public agencies are adopting methods and standards set by
global corporations, a part of an overall neoliberal worldview.
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the Export-Import Bank of the United States, 59 contained general
instructions on engagement, conflicts of interest, and ethical standards,
followed by issues such as diversity goals, case management, and billing
procedures. A mid-length version is Wachovia Corporation’s Legal
Division General Guidance. 60 OC firms and their lawyers have to agree to
follow the requirements, terms, and conditions of Wachovia’s OC
Guidelines. Lawyers are expected to deliver “high quality, cost-effective
legal services.” 61 The ethical issues discussed in the policy include
conflicts of interest (broadly defined), attorney-client privilege,
confidentiality, adverse publicity and contacts with the media, and
instructions regarding “defensive litigation,” including settlement,
pleadings, discovery, appeals, and lawyer diversity. 62
D. Specific Versus General Codes
Many large corporations have general Codes of Conduct or CSR
Reviews, either in addition to OC Guidelines or as exclusive documents
that apply across the organization. These include Bank of America,63
Boeing, 64 GE, 65 Merck, 66 and Coca-Cola. 67 Documents of this sort provide
a wide framework potentially affecting ethical conduct by OC. One
multinational beverage corporation we studied had a very short set of
guidelines for OC, but in addition to requiring OC to “maintain the highest
59. See Guidelines for Representation of Ex-Im Bank by Outside Counsel in Finance
Matters, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK U.S., http://www.exim.gov/products/policies/Outside
CounselGuidelines.pdf.
60. Wachovia, Legal Division General Guidance (on file with authors). Wachovia was
taken over by Wells Fargo in 2008. Wells Fargo Legal Division’s Engagement of Outside
Counsel is similar in length and content (though not identical) to Wachovia’s. Sections deal
with retention, diversity, conflicts, attorney-client privilege, confidentiality, the media, and
compliance. See Legal Division – Engagement of Outside Counsel, WELLS FARGO,
https://www.wellsfargo.com/about/corporate/legal/engagement (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. BANK OF AMERICA, CODE OF ETHICS ii (2012), available at http://phx.corporateir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=71595&p=irol-govconduct (follow “Code of Ethics” hyperlink)
(“The Code is based on our company’s Core Values. . . . The Code of Ethics provides the
guidance we need to translate our values into action as we compete in the marketplace and
engage with customers, clients, shareholders, vendors and each other.”).
64. BOEING, ETHICAL BUSINESS CONDUCT GUIDELINES 4, available at
http://www.boeing.com/companyoffices/aboutus/ethics/ethics_booklet.pdf (“We will always
take the high road by practicing the highest ethical standards.”); id. at 5 (“The highest
standards of ethical business conduct are required of Boeing employees.”).
65. GE, 2009 CITIZENSHIP REPORT: RENEWING RESPONSIBILITIES 36, available at
http://files.gecompany.com/gecom/citizenship/pdfs/ge_2009_citizenship_report.pdf (“The
GE commitment to perform with integrity . . . . is guided by our integrity policy, The Spirit
& The Letter . . . .”).
66. MERCK, LOOKING AHEAD: 2009-2010 CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REVIEW 15
(2010), available at http://www.merckresponsibility.com/downloads/Merck-2009-CSRReport.pdf (“[T]o ensure Merck achieves its business goals while meeting the letter and
spirit of the complex regulatory framework in which we operate.”).
67. COCA-COLA, CODE OF BUSINESS CONDUCT: ACTING WITH INTEGRITY AROUND THE
GLOBE (Apr. 2009), http://www.thecoca-colacompany.com/ourcompany/pdf/COBC_
English.pdf.
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ethical standards at all times,” also linked this to its Code of Business
Conduct.
In some corporations, lawyers’ terms of engagement are included under
“ethical” and CSR directives that govern suppliers. 68 GE, for example, has
a broad directive for all of its suppliers: the corporation’s “Integrity Guide
for Suppliers, Contractors and Consultants” 69 includes detailed
requirements on issues such as minimum age of employees, prohibition of
forced labor, environmental compliance, health and safety, and human
rights of employees, 70 and concludes with a prohibition on the use of
subcontractors or other third parties to evade legal requirements applicable
to the supplier. 71 Apple’s “Supplier Code of Conduct” also has broad
requirements regarding workers and human rights (including freedom of
association, bargaining, and unionizing), health and safety standards,
protecting the environment, and “ethics.” 72 Ethics includes maintaining fair
business standards, whistleblower protection, community engagement,
protection of intellectual property, and no tolerance of corruption.73
Although these codes apply to all suppliers, including lawyers, our main
focus will be on norms that address lawyers distinctively.
E. Goals and Objectives of Outside Counsel Guidelines
A review of guidelines, as well as interviews with law firms and inside
counsel, reveal a mixture of underlying motives; however, in most cases,
cost-effectiveness is emphasized. Bank of America’s litigation philosophy,
for example, illustrates this duality: “1. Advocacy: Bank of America,
while maintaining strong advocacy positions, seeks to facilitate the costeffective resolution of claims.
2. High Ethics:
Outside counsel
representing Bank of America is expected at all times to maintain the
highest ethical standards. Coercive, dilatory or obstructive tactics are not to
be used.” 74 In general, outside counsel are instructed “to uphold[] high
standards of professional and ethical conduct, and to ensur[e] timely,
responsive, and cost-effective service.” 75
68. See, e.g., Supplier Diversity, AT&T, http://www.att.com/gen/corporate-citizenship?
pid=17724 (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
69. See Integrity Guide for Suppliers, Contractors and Consultants, GE (Sept. 2009),
http://files.gecompany.com/gecom/citizenship/pdfs/ge_integrity_guide_suppliers_2009.pdf.
70. This section cautions against the following:
Failure to respect human rights of Supplier’s employees. Failure to observe
applicable laws and regulations governing wage and hours. Failure to allow
workers to freely choose whether or not to organize or join associations for the
purpose of collective bargaining as provided by local law or regulation. Failure to
prohibit discrimination, harassment and retaliation.
Id. at 3.
71. Id. at 4.
72. See Apple Supplier Code of Conduct, APPLE 1–5 (2010), http://images.apple.com/
supplierresponsibility/pdf/Supplier_Code_of_Conduct_V3_3.pdf.
73. Id. at 5–6.
74. BANK OF AMERICA, OUTSIDE COUNSEL PROCEDURES 12 (2011), available at
http://www.bankofamerica.com/suppliers/files/legalprocedures.pdf.
75. Id. at 3.
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A clear impression drawn from interviews with law firms is that if “doing
good” corresponds with “doing well” for the corporation, the higher the
probability the policy will be enforced. This seems to be the case with
diversity requirements: they are not only “the right thing to do,” but also
are considered good business practice. 76 Likewise, what seems to be fair
litigation policy (early and prompt conflict resolution, preference for
settlements, avoidance of combative discovery practices, prohibition of
protracted motion practice), can be regarded as good ethical standards as
well as good business tactics.77 This “market-embedded morality,” as
coined by Ronen Shamir, 78 seems to be a suitable framework for these
norms. It seems that the ethics and morality of corporate activities
strengthen and sustain their immediate market interests and, in the long run,
reinforce visions of neoliberal citizenship and responsible social action.79
F. Finances: Billing, Fees, and Costs
Most OC Guidelines include provisions about the financial arrangements
between lawyers and corporations. Indeed, some of the surveyed guidelines
include instructions on these issues only. They contain detailed instructions
about the need to report on and get approval of litigation strategy, staffing
(limit on the number of lawyers on a case), litigation motions, appeal
procedures, billing arrangements (hourly or other), expenses and
reimbursements (travel, mail, telephone calls, photocopying)—all to be
handled via arranged structures determined by the client. No doubt the
close supervision of lawyers’ fees and expenses is a relatively novel
development, the outcome of a shift in law firm structure and modes of
practice vis-à-vis corporate clients.80 We consider these arrangements not
for their own sake, but as part of the all-encompassing transformation in the
lawyer–corporate client relationship: as clients gain more control over
lawyers’ practices and dictate the terms of their work as part of their overall
business operations, instructions about billing and ethical practices are often
part of the same engagement record.
G. Customary Ethical Topics
Some OC Guidelines include directives relating to conflicts of interest
and confidentiality. These instructions cover topics that traditionally have
been under the jurisdiction of law societies and promulgated through

76. Interview with in-house counsel (July 2011).
77. See, e.g., Walmart, Bank of America, Fannie Mae, Universal Underwriters Group,
and the State of Minnesota, infra Appendix.
78. See Ronen Shamir, The Age of Responsibilization: On Market-Embedded Morality,
37 ECON. & SOC. 1 (2008).
79. See id. at 4.
80. The literature on changes in law firm structure and law firm client relations is vast.
See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of
Professional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2008); Larry E.
Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749.
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disciplinary rules. 81 However, a significant number of guidelines address
them and set new standards for lawyers’ conduct. It is beyond the scope of
this Article to provide a detailed account comparing disciplinary standards
and those included in OC Guidelines; however, an overview of selected
documents and interviews with law firms demonstrates that conflict-ofinterest norms are included to set a heightened standard for lawyers by their
clients.
Boston Scientific Corporation (a company that develops “innovative
medical solutions”) requires that its OC refrain not only from direct
conflicts (regarding information and data obtained within the lawyer-client
relationship), but also from indirect and positional conflicts. 82 The
corporation lists over forty competitor companies that OC may not
represent, “regardless of the nature of the representation,” without first
receiving permission from the corporation. 83 A large beverage company
holds the same policy regarding its main competitor.84 The Export-Import
Bank of the United States has a detailed appendix for conflicts of interest
that specifies in minute detail what it considers a “potentially adverse or
divergent interest,” restricting a lawyer who has worked with them from
subsequent representation. 85 One partner that we interviewed noted that
banks are particularly strict regarding conflict-of-interest rules, while oil

81. Rules promulgated on conflicts and confidentiality by Law Societies were never
exclusive, of course, and there had always been indirect regulation of them by courts, such as
when they were asked to disqualify lawyers during representation due to a conflict of
interest. See SUSAN R. MARTYN & LAWRENCE J. FOX, TRAVERSING THE ETHICAL MINEFIELD:
PROBLEMS, LAW, AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 262, 263 (2004) (“In the half past
century, however, courts have examined most conflicts of interest in the context of motions
to disqualify lawyers. . . . [L]itigation over the past 50 years has left no doubt that courts
can, and should, disqualify lawyers when their conduct threatens the fairness of a judicial
proceeding.”). Courts have also addressed conflicts in criminal proceedings, for example
when defendants argued that the right to effective assistance of counsel has been violated
due to conflict of interest of his lawyer or a violation of the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality.
See Case Comment, Criminal Law—Conflicts of Interest—First Circuit Rules that a
Defendant Whose Lawyer Had a Conflict that the Judge Should Have Known About Must
Show Adverse Effect to Receive a New Trial.—Mountjoy v. Warden, New Hampshire State
Prison, 115 HARV. L. REV. 938 (2002). On confidentiality, see McClure v. Thompson, 323
F.3d 1233, 1242–43 (9th Cir. 2003).
82. See BOS. SCI. CORP., PARTNERSHIP GUIDELINES FOR MATTER HANDLING AND BILLING
PRACTICES § G (2011) (on file with authors) (“It is important that you are sensitive to both
direct conflicts and indirect conflicts, i.e., conflicts that may arise from your firm’s advocacy
of other clients’ positions which conflict with BSC’s business objectives. If your firm is
designated as a ‘BSC preferred provider,’ we expect that the firm will not take public
positions adverse to BSC (e.g., in litigation or administrative proceedings). Your firm cannot
participate in any manner in any lawsuit against BSC.”). A lawyer from a large U.S. firm
admitted that restrictions regarding “positional conflicts” are potentially problematic.
Interview with Thomas E. Spahn, supra note 42.
83. BOS. SCI. CORP., supra note 82, § G.
84. Interview with general counsel of large beverage company (“[I]f you want to work
with us don’t work with them.”).
85. EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF U.S., supra note 59, at 4. This term refers to “cases in
which the other party is the borrower or a provider of subordinated financing or other
financing having rights to payment, collateral or voting other than on a pari passu basis in
the proposed Ex-Im Bank Financing.” Id.
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and gas companies have less stringent policies.86 He noted that law firms
have lost business not due to professional rules, but rather to clients’ stricter
rules on conflicts. In sum, we see that conflicts of interest receive much
attention in the lawyer–corporate client relationship.
To be sure, conflict rules are at the core of the lawyer–client relationship
and have always been central in lawyers’ ethics. The issue here is the
growing control of corporate clients in delineating the scope of
representational restrictions deriving from conflicts, as they define them.
A similar process occurs with respect to confidentiality requirements,
which are regularly included in OC Guidelines. 87 In this context, it is worth
noting requirement: first, “information security” prerequisites that clients
impose on lawyers (usually before they are retained). 88 One interviewee
noted that bank clients wanted to check the security of confidential bank
information on law firm computers and systems—and did so via on-site
audits. The second is binding OC to specific confidentiality and privacy
requirements of clients, such as bank privacy laws 89 (such as the U.S.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act). 90

86. Interview with London law firm partner (Aug. 2011).
87. See, e.g., BANK OF AMERICA, supra note 74, at 4 (requiring OC to “follow all
statutory and regulatory provisions relating to privacy, confidentiality and nondisclosure of
customer records, proprietary information of Bank of America, and other privileged or
confidential information, including without limitation information or data protection laws
and regulations”).
88. Bank of America, for example, obligates its OC to
use procedures and systems designed to (1) ensure the security, integrity and
confidentiality of Bank of America proprietary and customer information; (2)
protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of such
information; (3) protect against unauthorized access to or use of such information
that could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to Bank of America or any
person that is the subject of such information; and (4) ensure the proper disposal of
such information.
Id. at 18.
89. See, e.g., Wachovia, supra note 60 (“Outside Counsel is expected to ensure that nonpublic, proprietary and/or confidential information is protected and is not used or
communicated in violation of banking, securities, or other applicable laws and regulations,
or contrary to any applicable agreements or ethical standards. For example, the GrammLeach-Bliley Act imposes restrictions on the disclosure of non-public personal information
by financial institutions and on recipients of such information from financial institutions and
imposes certain information security obligations on financial institutions.”).
90. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified in scattered sections of 12 & 15 U.S.C.). The D.C. Circuit has
ruled that lawyers are not “financial institutions” under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, thus
they are not obligated to comply with the law’s privacy obligations. ABA v. FTC, 430 F.3d
457, 470–71 (D.C. Cir. 2005). However, lawyers are likely to be regarded as “service
providers” when they represent financial institutions, and may be required to provide
contractual assurances about their information security practices and, in particular, the steps
they are taking to protect any personal information they may acquire in the course of their
representation. See Peter Mucklestone & Stuart Louie, Lawyers as “Service Providers”
Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, PRIVACY & SEC. L. BLOG (Jun. 8, 2006),
http://www.privsecblog.com/2006/06/articles/financial-institutions/lawyers-as-serviceproviders-under-the-grammleachbliley-act/.
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H. Compliance with Specific Laws that Bind Lawyers and/or Clients
Some OC Guidelines (as well as procurement documents) include
explicit reference to legislation that applies to the corporation and/or to
lawyers. The most frequent reference is to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 91—
corporate obligations as well as lawyers’ “up the ladder” reporting duties.92
Wachovia, for example, incorporates within its guidelines a reporting duty
that exists in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 93 Other OC Guidelines require that
the firm abide by legislation and regulation regarding corruption94 and
“abusive tax shelters.” 95 In accordance with a policy of this sort, a large
Israeli law firm has been required to provide a written acknowledgement to
its client that it will not “pay, offer, or promise to pay or authorize the
payment directly or indirectly [of ] . . . anything of value to any government
official . . . political party . . . candidate for political office for the purpose
of inducing or rewarding favourable action . . . in any commercial
transaction or in any governmental matter.”96
I. General Ethical Duties, Duties Toward Third Parties, Gatekeeping,
and Whistleblowing
In interviews and some OC Guidelines, we came across instructions that
appear to be concerned with interests other than those of the client. To
begin with, some general guidelines ask suppliers (lawyers included) to
adhere to universal principles, such as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. 97
Others demand lawyers’ adherence to “highest ethical
standards.” 98 However, there are a number of corporations that attend
91. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
92. See infra Part III.I.
93. See Wachovia, supra note 60 (“Wachovia is also committed to conducting its
business in accordance with the highest ethical standards. . . . If Outside Counsel reasonably
believes that a material violation of law may have occurred, is occurring or is about to occur
at or involving Wachovia, as set forth in Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and
the SEC Rules promulgated thereunder . . . Outside Counsel must immediately and
confidentially contact a Deputy General Counsel or Wachovia’s General Counsel and the
responsible Legal Division Lawyer.”).
94. The Export-Import Bank of the United States, for example, clarifies its commitment
to adherence to anti-corruption laws. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and Other
Anti-bribery Measures, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK U.S., http://www.exim.gov/products/policies/
ForeignCorruptPracticesActFCPAandAnti-briberyMeasures.cfm (last updated July 23,
2010).
95. See BANK OF AMERICA, supra note 74, at 18.
96. Interview with law firm compliance officer (Apr. 2011).
97. See Statement of Principles on Human Rights, GE (2009), http://www.ge.com/files_
citizenship/pdf/ge_statement_principles_human_rights.pdf (“GE, as a business enterprise,
promotes the advancement of fundamental human rights. We support the principles
contained in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, remaining mindful that it is
primarily addressed to nations. GE has joined with other companies to find practical ways of
applying within the business community the broad principles established in the
Declaration.”); see also APPLE, supra note 72, at 1 (“Suppliers must uphold the human rights
of workers, and treat them with dignity and respect as understood by the international
community.”).
98. See BANK OF AMERICA, supra note 74, at 10.
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specifically to lawyers’ professional conduct. The most prominent are
directives contending with “over-zealous” adversarial representation, as
well as duties to the justice system and to the adversary during litigation.
Some corporations (though not many) have specific litigation guidelines
that limit lawyers’ “legal toolkit.” No doubt Walmart has the most farreaching instructions to its OC, 99 but other corporations also direct lawyers
to not use “coercive, dilatory or obstructive tactics” and discourage
protracted motion practice.
Many corporations demand that lawyers representing them utilize ADR
measures, strive to achieve settlements, assess the case to see the strength of
defense and decide on strategy accordingly, and generally manage cases in
a way that is both more conciliatory and cost-effective. 100 These dual goals
are not contradictory. Walmart’s past reputation as a business that
contested and aggressively disputed every claim not only resulted in a
reputational loss, but was also an enormous financial burden; thus a more
conciliatory and less aggressive stance might serve both interests.101
Finally, some corporations impose upon their outside lawyers’ direct
“gatekeeping” requirements when they encounter improper behavior of
corporate officers or staff. Walmart expects its OC to go beyond that
standard, stating under “Ethical Conduct” instructions:
If Outside Counsel believes that a Walmart associate (including any Legal
Department personnel) has or will engage in illegal or unethical activity
as a representative or agent of the Company, that person must
immediately and confidentially contact the [Responsible Legal
Department Attorney (RLDA)] (or a Walmart Associate General CounselSection Head or General Counsel, as appropriate). No Walmart Associate
has the authority to instruct Outside Counsel to act in an unethical manner
in connection with any Walmart matter. 102

In other words, OC are being used as a mechanism to monitor improper
behavior of the client’s agents, turning them into “lawyers–gatekeepers.”
Whether guidelines of this sort aim to achieve more efficient and cost
effective management of caseload, their mere existence is novel and quite
an astounding development. They represent a set of practices that seems to
stand in contrast with the recognized and often infamous professional

99. See infra Part IV.
100. See Bank of America, Fannie Mae, Universal Underwriters Group, Wachovia Group,
Walmart, Zurich Insurance, The Export-Import Bank of America, infra Appendix.
101. See, e.g., Zurich, LITIGATION MANAGEMENT: GUIDELINES FOR DEFENCE COUNSEL 3,
available at http://www.zurich.com/NR/rdonlyres/E4145DF3-23EF-48CC-93A6-07D10F1
B791F/0/LMG.pdf (“Zurich expects to work with defence counsel and its insureds to
achieve the best result for the insured in an efficient and cost-conscious manner consistent
with the law firm’s ethical obligations. Nothing contained herein is intended to nor shall
restrict counsel’s exercise of independent professional judgment in rendering legal services
for the insured or otherwise interfere with any ethical directive governing the conduct of
counsel.”).
102. WAL-MART STORES INC., OUTSIDE COUNSEL GUIDELINES (U.S. FIRMS) 15 (2010) (on
file with authors) [hereinafter WALMART GUIDELINES].

2012]

CLIENT CONTROL OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS

2595

culture of zealous, adversarial representation, and thus take part in shaping
an alternative professional ethos and normative ethical landscape.
J. Diversity and Work–Life Balance Requirements
A large number of corporations require OC to include women and
minorities in the staff providing legal services; some also refer to “social
background.” 103 During procurement procedures, firms are to provide
information on staff makeup, as well as policies relating to diversity.
Diversity is conceptualized not just as the right thing to do, but also as a
sound business strategy. As the general counsel of a multinational retailer
corporation explained, its Legal Division
is committed to making diversity a competitive advantage within our
organization by, among other things, ensuring that our internal workforce
and the outside lawyers working on our matters reflect the diverse
community that is our consumer base . . . . Law firm partners will also be
expected to provide periodic reporting . . . evidencing progress in
alignment to the Company’s diversity goals. 104

Some corporations are satisfied with their OC making a good faith effort to
recruit, retain, and promote qualified women and minorities; others require
a detailed report on these efforts, or impose an even stricter requirement
that the list of Relationship Partner candidates includes a designated
number of women, minorities, and partners on flex-time. 105
It seems that diversity requirements are becoming one of the standard
terms of engagement. In 2011, Walmart accompanied its Diversity
Guidelines with “flex-time” requirements. 106 The rationale for adding this
condition was that women and minorities are often at a disadvantage when
working hours are long and inflexible; 107 it is also possible that lawyers
who are not overworked can provide a better service.
IV. WALMART
Walmart is an important source of work for OC; as of 2009, it used about
680 outside law firms, both large and small. 108 Walmart itself has thirteen
different legal divisions, all with their own budgets and financial
accountability. They cover areas such as real estate, international affairs,
Sam’s Club (a chain of membership-only retail warehouse clubs owned and
operated by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.), corporate affairs and government,
103. Interview with London law firm partner, supra note 54 (social background is a
requirement imposed by Morgan Stanley upon its OC).
104. Interview with general counsel (June 13, 2011).
105. The benefit that this has for candidates is reinforced by a requirement (which is
monitored) that the RP receive all credit for the work brought into the firm. See infra note
130 and accompanying text.
106. See infra Part IV.A.2; cf. Interview with personnel at London law firm (Sept. 2011)
(stating that they have encountered requirements under which associates must not work more
than ten hours a day).
107. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
108. See Meredith Hobbs, On the Same Page, LEGAL WK., Apr. 21, 2011, at 14.
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litigation, and class actions. The Walmart OC Guidelines therefore provide
a means of managing these diverse relationships efficiently and with as
much specificity as possible.
The Guidelines also may be seeking to address a reputation that Walmart
wishes to change. Walmart had a reputation for aggressively pursuing
litigation even when it would have been cheaper to settle. In 1999, Judge
James Mehaffy accused Walmart of “thwarting, obfuscating and
obstructing” court procedure, and threatened to fine Walmart $18 million
for withholding an internal study of parking lot security sought by a woman
who was abducted from a Walmart parking lot. 109 The corporation also had
a “long history of refusing to negotiate with plaintiffs” as well as a policy of
“scrimping on legal costs.” 110
However, these policies appear to have changed dramatically following
the appointment of more experienced in-house lawyers. 111 The changes are
reflected in Walmart’s OC Guidelines, which were revised most recently in
2010. They “supersede previously issued guidelines” 112 and are one of the
longest and most exhaustive sets of guidelines we came across in our
research. The new Guidelines were designed to be more user-friendly,
increase efficiencies, reduce costs, and raise the level of the diversity
initiatives. They now comprise three parts: a thirty-three-page set of
guidelines; a sixteen-page Invoicing Addendum; and two Appendices
which run for forty-seven pages. 113
The Guidelines “set forth the expectations [Walmart] has of its outside
law firms and define an effective working relationship with Walmart. All
attorneys and professional staff who work on matters for Walmart must be
familiar with these Guidelines . . . . [They] constitute the terms under
which Outside Counsel are engaged.” 114 The contents reveal the very
broad coverage of the Guidelines. They include sections on diversity and
flex-time, engaging OC, Wal-Mart’s relationship partner, conflicts of
interest, staffing, confidentiality, ethical conduct, malpractice insurance, file
retention, e-mail, information security, media contact, gifts and gratuities,
evaluation and feedback, audits, managing litigation, pleadings and
motions, discovery, settlement and ADR, filing appeals, managing nonlitigation matters, and invoicing for fees and expenses.115 The latter is
supplemented by the Invoicing Addendum.
The expectations of OC are set out in general terms at the beginning:
Walmart expects . . . Outside Counsel . . . to provide the Company with
the highest quality legal services in the most cost-effective manner
possible. We expect Outside Counsel to stress integrity, professionalism,
109. Richard Willing, Lawsuits Follow Growth Curve of Wal-Mart, USA TODAY, Aug.
14, 2001, at A1.
110. DeMott, supra note 40, at 972–73 (quoting Catherine Aman & Gary Young, WalMart Shifting Litigation Strategy, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 30, 2002, at A29).
111. Id. at 974.
112. WALMART GUIDELINES, supra note 102, at 6.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 2–5.
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a sense of urgency in resolving legal problems, and sensitivity to
protecting and honoring the three fundamental principles that have
contributed to our success: respect for the individual, service to our
customers and a constant striving for excellence. 116

OC are also expected to demonstrate commitment to diversity, including
honoring flexible work schedules, responsiveness and timely
communication with in-house attorneys, working knowledge of Walmart’s
business and legal goals, and compliance with OC Guidelines.117
OC are also entitled to expectations of Walmart’s behavior. They can
expect from Walmart, among other things: cooperation with OC, feedback,
a commitment to professionalism and integrity in working with OC,
demonstration of Walmart’s three basic beliefs, working knowledge of
Walmart’s business and legal goals, demonstrated commitment to diversity,
including honoring flexible work schedules, and compliance with OC
Guidelines. 118
There are two features of the Guidelines that are particularly significant.
The first is related to requirements regarding operational aspects of the OC
firm, which include guidelines relating to diversity, flex-time, and
Relational Partners. The second addresses Outside Counsel’s conduct
during professional activity. We will look at each in turn.
A. Law Firm Operation
1. Diversity
The commitment to diversity “both internally and in its [OC] hiring
practices” appears to go far beyond mere rhetoric.119 As the Guidelines put
it, “Diversity is not just about doing the right thing,” it is in Walmart’s own
interest: “we believe that a culturally sensitive, diverse workplace is better
able to serve our needs and produce better results.” 120
This belief is followed by a series of detailed requirements: law firm
diversity is measured by “[o]verall law firm demographics,”
“[d]emographics of the firm’s Walmart team,” and “[g]ood-faith efforts
exhibited by the firm.” 121 The latter is defined as including “[h]aving an
active diversity committee,” “[i]mplementing a diversity plan,” “[a]ttending
and sponsoring diversity events,” “[i]ncreasing efforts to develop and retain
women and minority attorneys,” and “[i]nvesting in the future of the
profession (e.g., pipeline efforts).” 122 Walmart “encourages Outside

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8.
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Counsel to utilize qualified diverse attorneys as appropriate when staffing
Walmart matters.” 123
2. Flex-Time
Walmart Guidelines state, “[W]e are equally committed to promoting
balanced work arrangements, as set out in our internal Flex-Time
Policy.” 124 Under this policy, attorneys should be allowed to work a
flexible or reduced-hours schedule, work from home, or job share.
Flex-time was first introduced within Walmart before becoming a
requirement for OC in the 2010 Guidelines. 125 The development may have
been influenced by the National Association of Women Lawyers survey,
which highlighted the challenges women, especially women of color, face
to advance their careers in the legal profession.126 The implementation of
flex-time followed the participation of Jeff Gearhart, Walmart’s Executive
Vice President and General Counsel, in the Project for Attorney Retention’s
Annual Diversity and Flexibility Connection Conference:
Balanced work schedules for attorneys are part of the business case for
diversity at Walmart and we believe they will come to matter more and
more to other large consumers of legal services for a number of reasons.
First, attrition rates in large law firms, even in good economic times, are
upwards of 20%—more than double those in most industries. The loss of
a talented associate or partner due to the absence of balanced work
arrangements results in lost institutional knowledge from both a firm and
client perspective. This is not only disruptive to the continuity of work, it
is also expensive—both to the law firm losing the attorneys and to the
clients to whom the firm passes on those costs.
Moreover, the absence of flex-time arrangements has been shown to
have seriously detrimental effect on the careers of women and minorities.
In fact, minority female lawyers have the highest attrition rate of any
group of lawyers and we are beginning to understand that a lack of
work/life balance may play a major role for many of these attorneys. 127

Many law firms used by Walmart are small, two- to three-partner firms
providing localized services and local counsel in areas such as land use,
casualty, and tort. In these firms, a flex-time requirement is fairly
redundant. However, many of the large firms that Walmart uses might be
reluctant to introduce flexible working time because of billable hour

123. Id. at 14. For more on Walmart’s diversity efforts, see Sheri Qualters, Flextime
Among the New Criteria for Clients’ Evaluation of Law Firms, LAW.COM (Oct. 27, 2009),
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202434954310.
124. WALMART GUIDELINES, supra note 102, at 8.
125. Walmart Announces Flex-Time Requirements for Outside Law Firms, WALMART
LEGAL NEWS 1, 2 (Nov. 2009), http://walmartlegal.rfi-walmart.com/WalmartLegalNewsletter.pdf.
126. See NAT’L ASS’N OF WOMEN LAWYERS, REPORT OF THE FOURTH ANNUAL NATIONAL
SURVEY OF THE PROMOTION AND RETENTION OF WOMEN IN LAW FIRMS (Oct. 2009), available
at http://nawl.timberlakepublishing.com/files/2009%20Survey%20Report%20FINAL.pdf.
127. WALMART LEGAL NEWS, supra note 125, at 1.
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requirements and other pressures. Walmart therefore may be able to
influence a different approach to this work-life balance issue.
Flexible schedules may be in the interests of Walmart as well as of those
individuals who benefit from them, another example of enlightened selfinterest: “We believe such arrangements promote attorney retention,
facilitate the implementation of alternative-fee arrangements, and create a
more balanced work environment.” 128 They also prevent the loss of
institutional knowledge and create a more balanced and inclusive work
environment.
In the recent Guidelines, Walmart set a deadline of February 1, 2011 for
firms to implement flex-time policies that the law firm deems appropriate
for the firm and its U.S.-based attorneys. 129 It threatened to terminate its
relationship with any firm that did not implement such a policy, unless the
firm communicated “an acceptable reason why the implementation of such
a policy is not practical.” 130
3. Relationship Partners
The significance of these diversity and flex-time commitments is
reinforced by Walmart’s requirements regarding Relationship Partners
(RPs) and the way they are chosen. The RP is the primary contact at the
law firm and manages the relationship. Walmart relies on its RPs, who are
responsible for compliance with the Guidelines.131 The RP’s duties include
“[t]aking demonstrable steps to advance diversity” and “monitoring and
advising on conflicts of interest.” 132
The OC firm must produce a list of five possible RPs, which “must
contain at least one attorney of color, at least one female attorney, and at
least one attorney who works on a flexible work schedule, provided the firm
has at least one such attorney.” 133 Given that it has historically been more
difficult for women and minorities to develop large and sustained books of
business, when compared with their white male counterparts, the Walmart
OC Guidelines address the lack of equal opportunity within the legal
profession.
The significance of this is enhanced by Walmart’s requirement that the
Walmart RP shall receive full “Origination Credit” for all Walmart work
coming into the firm. This requirement is enforced by Walmart demanding,
from a senior member of the firm, a certificate that the RP has received or
will receive the credit. This is known as Origin Credit Certification, 134 and
is a substantial incursion into the internal affairs of the law firm.
128. WALMART GUIDELINES, supra note 102, at 8.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 9.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 10.
134. Id. (The firm “shall annually certify in writing on or before January 31 of each year
that the Walmart [RP has] received or will receive full credit for all Walmart work brought
into the firm in the preceding twelve-month period and that no such work was disseminated
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This requirement reflects the fact that the Walmart legal department
understands the way law firms reward their partners. The “coin of the
realm” in law firms depends upon who has the relationship with the client.
Many of the large law firms have numerous corporate clients. Walmart
believes that this credit requirement helps convert the rhetoric of diversity
and flex-time into a reality.
B. Professional Conduct
1. Ethical Conduct
The second highly significant area of interest in the Guidelines concerns
the ethical standards required of OC. Once again, as with so many of the
OC Guidelines, there appears to be a degree of high “rhetoric.” But here,
too, there is also some attempt to make these a reality.
The rhetoric in the introduction to the Guidelines is repeated later on in
the section on Ethical Standards: “Walmart conducts its business in
accordance with the highest ethical standards and expects the same of its
[OC].” 135 Furthermore, “[a]ll OC are required to adhere to Walmart’s
However, there are many more specific
Statement of Ethics.” 136
requirements, some of which reinforce or expand upon ABA Model Rules.
To begin with, Walmart includes a broad definition of circumstances in
which a conflict of interest arises. The OC Guidelines prohibit OC from
representing Walmart in any matter in which a conflict of interest exists,
and includes not only actual, potential, or other conflicts as defined by any
applicable code of professional responsibility or rules of professional
conduct. It broadens conflict of interest to include whatever Walmart may
conclude is a conflict of interest, “if Outside Counsel represents a
significant competitor.” 137
However, ethics are not confined to the traditional topics included in
ethical codes. The OC Guidelines incorporate matters that are usually
regulated by the state. For example, OC are required by Walmart to report
illegal or unethical activity. 138 In those circumstances, there is a duty to
immediately and confidentially contact authorized personnel at Walmart. 139
In addition, when it comes to representing Walmart in litigation, the
Guidelines go from broad aspiration into great detail, and instruct OC to:

within the firm without the knowledge and consent of the Walmart [RP]. Such certification
shall be provided by the firm’s Chairperson, Managing Partner, General Counsel, Chief
Financial Officer, or other such person in a position of firm leadership. In no instances shall
the Walmart [RP] be required to provide the aforementioned certification.”).
135. Id. at 15.
136. Id.; see also WALMART STATEMENT OF ETHICS (rev. Sept. 2008), available at
http://walmartstores.com/media/cdnpull/statementofethics/pdf/U.S_SOE.pdf.
137. WALMART GUIDELINES, supra note 102, at 11.
138. See id. at 15.
139. Id. (reporting should be made to the “AGC-OCM (or a Walmart Associate General
Counsel–Section Head or General Counsel, as appropriate)”).
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Honor the spirit, intent, and requirements of all rules of civil procedure
and rules of professional conduct
Conduct themselves in a manner that enhances and preserves the dignity
and integrity of the system of justice
Adhere to the principles and rules of conduct that further the truth-seeking
process so that disputes will be resolved in a just, dignified, courteous,
and efficient manner
Make reasonable responses to discovery requests and not interpret them in
an artificially restrictive manner so as to avoid disclosure of relevant and
non-privileged information . . .
Make good faith efforts to resolve disputes concerning pleadings and
discovery
Agree to reasonable requests for extension of time and waiver of
procedural formalities when doing so will not adversely affect Walmart’s
legitimate rights
Prepare and submit discovery requests that are limited to those requests
reasonably necessary for the prosecution or defense of an action and not
for the purpose of placing an undue burden or expense on another
party. 140

Although some of these guidelines are open to interpretation and clearly
require the exercise of professional judgment, the sanction for failing to
adhere to these standards is set out in no uncertain terms: “Walmart will
terminate its relationship . . . .” 141
2. Discovery Proceedings
Historically, Walmart had a reputation for being sanctioned for
discovery-related issues. This reputation may have been the result of
unethical behavior, but it is also possible that the company was simply
inundated with discovery requests and, as a result, found it difficult to keep
up with them. Walmart reported that it had been sued 4,851 times in the
year 2000, or once every two hours; juries decided a case in which Walmart
was a defendant about six times every business day; and Walmart lawyers
listed 9,400 open cases. 142
This probably explains why, about five years ago, Walmart established a
Litigation Support Group, within the Litigation Group, with the sole task of
processing discovery requests. 143 As one interviewee put it, the “whole
philosophy has changed—we do care if we are sanctioned.”144 Since 2008,
no firm has been terminated because of discovery sanctions.
The Discovery section goes into some detail:
140. Id. at 18.
141. Id.
142. Willing, supra note 109.
143. Compare, for example, that in the United Kingdom, Herbert Smith “outsourced” the
management of all its discovery work to Belfast, Northern Ireland. David Gold, Litigators
Must Adapt to New Practices or Perish, THE TIMES, Sept. 15, 2011, at 63.
144. Interview with general counsel, supra note 104.
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Form objections [to discovery requests] are to be avoided. All objections
must fully articulate the legal and factual basis for the objection. . . .
Outside Counsel are expected to make informed, ethical decisions with
respect to discovery responses . . . . [and] are required to conduct
discovery in a manner that enhances and preserves the dignity and
integrity of the justice system. Under no circumstances shall Outside
Counsel engage in or encourage a violation of any discovery or ethical
rule concerning the timely and appropriate disclosure of information to
which a litigant is entitled. . . .
Sanctions for discovery violations will not be tolerated and may result in
the immediate termination of Outside Counsel. 145

These standards were unchanged from the earlier Guidelines. However, the
2010 Guidelines require OC to report significant developments involving
“[a]ny orders granting such discovery motions or awarding sanctions.” 146
3. Settlement and Alternative Dispute Resolution
A fourth area of significance is the section on settlement and ADR:
“Walmart encourages early settlement discussions when the settlement of a
litigated matter is ‘the right thing to do’ under the circumstances.”147 It
encourages the use of ADR: “Outside Counsel should proactively identify
and bring to the attention of the PIC all opportunities to utilize ADR.”148
4. Monitoring Performance
Ongoing relationships with OC are developed, and OC performance is
monitored, in a number of ways. The in-house lawyers within the various
divisions who are responsible for sending work to OC have fairly regular
contact. Walmart also has an Office of OC Management which may also
have contact with OC. In addition, every other year, Walmart holds a twoday OC conference. The CEO and General Counsel attend the first day,
during which Walmart’s expectations—as well as feedback from OC—are
presented. On the second day, there are smaller sessions within each
specialist subject area. 149
The Walmart Guidelines are probably the most exhaustive that we have
come across. We have been told that relationships with particular law firms
have been terminated under the Guidelines. The most common reason for
termination has been “ethical lapses” by OC. The current view of Walmart
is that the company cannot afford any sort of taint from an ethical
standpoint. It wants to avoid being sanctioned for tactical as well as
145. WALMART GUIDELINES, supra note 102, at 22–23.
146. Id. at 19.
147. Id. at 24.
148. Id. at 25.
149. Walmart OC Guidelines serve as a training model for the Association of Corporate
Counsel. See, e.g., Value Practice: Walmart Performance Evaluation, ASS’N CORP.
COUNSEL, http://www.acc.com/legalresources/resource.cfm?show=39926 (last visited Apr.
21, 2012).
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reputational reasons. Therefore, where OC fall short of the ethical
standards expected, even if the sanctions received by OC are unrelated to
Walmart representation, the relationship with the firm will be limited or
even terminated. In addition, firms have been terminated because they did
not adapt as quickly as Walmart required to the diversity expectations.
V. ANALYSIS
Lawyers’ ethical judgments are typically made in private and are
unobservable. The opportunities for external monitoring by regulators are
limited. It is no wonder that professional codes and external regulation play
such a small part in the lives of large firm lawyers. Failures are rarely
identified until things have gone seriously wrong. 150 This is why some
scholars call for lawyers to exercise their “professional conscience”151 or to
act in a self-aware manner with integrity152 when making ethical choices.
However, other scholars question whether this is realistic, at least with
respect to ethics in large law firms, since “[c]onsulting an internal moral
compass is foreign to the large firm lawyers’ habit of mind.” 153 Similarly,
the “rush to judgment” of lawyers’ conduct that routinely follows major
“crises” 154 in the legal profession also mostly ignores the context of
corporate legal practice.155 These limitations apply across the ethical
landscape: when client interests are at stake—and, more critically, when
lawyers need to balance client interests with the public interest.
Lessons can be learned from the Enron case: not only did Enron’s
general counsel consider his in-house legal department to be a “‘worldclass’ in-house law firm,” 156 Enron was also advised by Arthur Andersen,
then one of the “Big 5” accounting firms, and overseen by a “top-notch”
board of directors. 157 Most experts believed that Enron had “a state of the

150. See generally RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DOCK: LEARNING FROM ATTORNEY
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS (2008) (detailing ethics cases brought against lawyers); W.H.
Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer’s Duty of Candor and the Bar’s Temptations
of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 243 (1998) (discussing the Kaye Scholer
ethics case).
151. Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO.
WASH. L REV. 1, 21–22 (2005).
152. See Sharon Dolovich, Ethical Lawyering and the Possibility of Integrity, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 1629 (2002).
153. See, e.g., Kimberley Kirkland, Ethics in Large Firms: The Principle of Pragmatism,
35 U. MEM. L. REV. 631, 729–30 (2005).
154. See, e.g., ENRON AND OTHER CORPORATE FIASCOS, supra note 48; Eli Wald, Lawyers
and Corporate Scandals, 7 LEGAL ETHICS 54, 59 (2004).
155. Whelan, supra note 47, at 1067–68.
156. Final Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner, In re Enron Corp., No. 0116034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., Nov. 4, 2003), app. C, at 15. Enron had 250 attorneys most of
whom had between eight and seventeen years of legal experience when they joined. Id. at 16.
157. The directors reflected a wide range of business, finance, accounting, and
government experience and included “a group of men and women who were highly
successful in their professional careers.” Final Report of Neal Batson, supra note 156, at 56–
57; see also Whelan, supra note 47, at 1098.
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art Code of Conduct.” 158 No wonder outside counsel, dealing with
complex transactions on the direction of such a sophisticated client
ultimately deferred to in-house counsel and to Enron itself, even when there
was concern about some of the legal ramifications.159 Thus prospects that
lawyers could act as “gatekeepers” on behalf of the public, and become
watchdogs and whistleblowers of their clients, seem a long way off in
practice. 160 It is unlikely that the changes in legal education so often
prompted by such crises will change things either.161
The privatizing of professionalism may therefore offer a new method
with additional tools for the effective monitoring of lawyer ethical conduct.
External regulators cannot effectively monitor the behavior of individual
lawyers or law firms, but corporate clients can. Not only can clients,
especially in-house counsel, monitor lawyer conduct directly and indirectly,
they have the leverage to direct and to manage particular behavior. Our
research suggests that this is what many corporate clients actually do.
The division of function between barristers and solicitors in England
presents a basis for comparison. Just as the barrister is instructed and
monitored by the sophisticated “professional client”—the solicitor—OC
work can be monitored by in-house counsel. The barrister knows that the
work will be assessed and evaluated by someone who knows what should
be done and what could have been done by the barrister. The same is true
for OC. Unlike the individual client–lawyer relationship, there is no
informational asymmetry preventing assessment by the client of the quality
of legal service.162 Clients of global law firms are “expert buyers of legal
services;” 163 large corporate clients are very sophisticated when it comes to
telling OC what they want.
In addition, in-house lawyers have a close relationship with their OC;
they are repeat players.164 Moreover, pressures on OC to deviate from
ethical norms, which may come from lay officers of the corporate client,
may be diluted by intermediary in-house lawyers. 165 In short, they are in a

158. Jennifer Schaller, Almost Ten Years After the Enron Meltdown: More Costs, More
Prosecution,
More
Compliance?,
NAT’L
L.
REV.
(July
7,
2010),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/almost-ten-years-after-enron-meltdown-more-costsmore-prosecution-more-compliance.
159. Whelan, supra note 47, at 1096–99.
160. Sung Hui Kim, Naked Self-Interest? Why the Legal Profession Resists Gatekeeping,
63 FLA. L. REV. 129, 132 (2011); Geoffrey Miller, From Club to Market: The Evolving Role
of Business Lawyers, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1105, 1106–07 (2005).
161. Arnold Rochvarg, Enron, Watergate and the Regulation of the Legal Profession, 43
WASHBURN L.J. 61, 67, 88–90 (2004).
162. C.G. Veljanovski & C.J. Whelan, Professional Negligence and the Quality of Legal
Services—An Economic Perspective, 46 MOD. L. REV. 700, 704–05 (1983).
163. Alexia Garamfalvi, England Poised to Reform Legal Market, LAW.COM (Aug. 10,
2006), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1155114327477 (quoting
Brian McDonnell, an associate with the London office of Hunton & Williams).
164. As many as twenty Vinson & Elkins lawyers joined Enron’s in-house legal
department, including a former partner, James Derrick, Enron’s general counsel since 1991.
Brenda Sapnio Jeffreys, V&E Closes Book on Enron, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 11, 2002, at 16.
165. Kim, supra note 44, at 1001–26.
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unique institutional position to impose, monitor, and enforce ethical
standards.
Large firm and global lawyers also face the reality of “double
deontology,” the fact that ethical conduct rules vary between different
jurisdictions. Practitioners may have to be aware of and abide by local
rules. Even within single jurisdictions, the days of requiring all lawyers to
adhere to the same professional code—despite the multiplicity and diversity
Privatizing
of legal practice and practitioners—may be over. 166
professionalism enables clients to set their own standards and make sure
their lawyers abide by a single set of standards, no matter where they
practice.
However, privatizing professional responsibility promises even more
than this. Scholars have emphasized the need for an “ethical infrastructure”
in law firms. 167 Large corporate clients and their in-house legal teams can,
via OC procedures, force firms to create such an infrastructure.168 We have
seen that special committees have had to be formed, new systems of
monitoring have been introduced, certification and reporting requirements
have been imposed. One firm has even been subjected to inspection and
on-site audit.
In other words, OC procedures can influence the
organizational structure and culture within law firms.
Some of the in-house general counsel we interviewed stated that part of
the rationale for imposing ethical obligations on their OC was that they
knew exactly what the realities were in large firm practice. They knew
about the pressures on associates in terms of work-life balance, billing, the
desire to make partner, and so on. The pressures to deviate from ethical
conduct in the name of making profits and bringing in business included,
according to a “big firm” partner in Australia, “inflating time sheets,
undertaking such unnecessary research, exaggerating the need to review
everything during discovery, undertaking overzealous due diligence
processes, and other practices.” 169 He went on: “[W]e cheat and lie to
make ends meet. We act dishonestly as a matter of course. We do it
because we have no choice.” 170 It is not surprising that increasing
bureaucratization within large firms and the existing criteria for personal
lawyer success is a threat to traditional notions of professionalism. 171 With
166. Andrew M. Francis, Legal Ethics, the Marketplace and the Fragmentation of Legal
Professionalism, 12 INT’L J. LEG. PROF. 173, 175 (2005).
167. Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure
in Large Law Firms: A Call for Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691, 692
(2002); Ted Schneyer, A Tale of Four Systems: Reflections on How Law Influences the
“Ethical Infrastructure” of Law Firms, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 245, 246 (1998).
168. See Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics
Advisors, General Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 ARIZ.
L. REV. 559, 560–61 (2002); Anthony E. Davis, The Emergence of Law Firm General
Counsel and the Challenges Ahead, 20 PROF. LAW., no. 2, 2010 at 1 (noting that there are
very few large law firms that do not now have a full-time general counsel to manage the
firm’s compliance with professional regulation).
169. EVANS, supra note 10, at 36–37.
170. Id. at 37.
171. Kirkland, supra note 153, at 730.
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a picture as stark as this, perhaps privatizing professional responsibility is
the only viable alternative for clients as well as the only way possible to
achieve professionalism and ethical accountability.
There are other reasons for OC Guidelines. Large corporate clients are
often concerned with protecting their reputations.172 The conduct of the
lawyers they hire can adversely affect that reputation, hence the desire to
police conduct. Wilkins has noted that one of the benefits that corporations
receive when they hire OC is “the legitimacy that lawyers receive by virtue
of their status as officers of the legal system.” 173 Clients also get the
benefit of attorney-client privilege, something that in many parts of the
world, in-house lawyers cannot offer. 174 It is no wonder that some of the
procedures reinforce professional obligations to the system.
Another context for the transformation of professional responsibility via
OC procedures is CSR, which is based on notions of community
accountability. There may be sound reasons for this. Corporations,
especially publicly held corporations, have a relatively high degree of
public accountability. They are subject to scrutiny in a variety of forums,
from regulators, such as the SEC in the United States, to public interest
groups worldwide. Corporations are certainly more publicly accountable
than private law firms, which are normally LLPs and owned by members of
the firm. And while law firms seek to create a positive public image, for
example through their pro bono activities,175 the pressure on corporations is
greater. Thus, the in-house legal department at a publicly held corporation
is likely to have a very different worldview than the private law firm. They
will be influenced by the culture in which they operate—one that is publicly
accountable. That may be why the questions being asked of corporations in
a world of CSR—including questions about diversity and how the
corporation is benefitting society—will be asked of the in-house legal
department along with everybody else.
Corporations have the resources and, possibly, the motivation to promote
lawyers’ ethics alongside other social and community norms. Their power
to instigate positive as well as negative change should not be underestimated, as our study has shown. More than traditional sources of
professional regulation, corporations have the information and resources
that other regulators lack. Corporate “regulators” also have a power to
control that is not necessarily constrained by concerns about legal
legitimacy, democratic accountability, or rule-of-law rhetoric. Of course,
one must always be realistic and perhaps skeptical of OC procedures. Just
172. Kevin T. Jackson, Global Corporate Governance: Soft Law and Reputational
Accountability, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 41, 45 (2010).
173. Wilkins, supra note 45, at 2118.
174. See, e.g., Case C-550/07, Akzo Nobel Chemicals, Ltd. v. Comm’n (Sept. 14, 2010),
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=82839&page
Index=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1397857 (decision of the
European Court of Justice).
175. One interviewee from a law firm welcomed the reporting requirements imposed on
his firm regarding pro bono activities and diversity because “we can brag about ourselves.”
Interview with London law firm partner, supra note 54.
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as professional codes of conduct can be legitimately viewed as designed to
achieve contradictory objectives—on the one hand, effective selfregulation, high ideals, and real discipline with effective sanctions; on the
other, an attempt to control the market or a sham—the same may be true of
OC procedures. However, we feel confident in claiming that many of the
procedures are more than mere rhetoric, 176 and in attributing to these
procedures a significant impact on large law firms, which the firms
themselves generally resent even if they sometimes also acknowledge their
usefulness. Indeed, OC procedures have a number of significant advantages
over professional codes.
Like professional codes, OC procedures combine different types of
obligations. There are “principles” which call for professional judgment,
such as the general directive to follow the highest ethical standards. There
are “standards,” which stress particular virtues, such as instruction
prohibiting coercive, dilatory, or obstructive tactics in litigation. Finally,
there are “rules,” which prescribe specific conduct in much more detail,
such as the rules on billing and conflicts of interest. Achieving compliance
with standards and principles is not impossible, but is much more difficult
than with rules. This is because “standards” and “principles” are, by their
very nature, more vague and open to interpretation. In practice, sanctions
for non-compliance with professional codes, although theoretically possible
in all cases, are in practice likely only when there is a breach of specific
rules.
Unlike professional codes, however, the enforcement of all obligations
in OC procedures can be much more effective. This is because large
corporate clients do not have to justify their decision to impose the ultimate
sanction: termination of the relationship. A good example of this would be
the rules on conflicts of interest to be found in both professional codes and
OC procedures. Rules on conflicts of interest require law firms to reject
clients in many circumstances; the firms do not like these rules as a result.
Indeed, London firms “have been notorious in seeking to circumvent them
at times.” 177 By contrast, not only are OC procedure provisions on
conflicts generally wider in scope than professional codes, the threat of
losing the client in the event of a breach can act as a much more powerful
deterrent. One interviewee called the conflict rules imposed by clients “a
nightmare 178
178F

CONCLUSION
Governance is concerned with the ways in which conduct and behavior
can be monitored and regulated. It can take many forms, both formal, such
as through government and law, and informal, for example through
communities or the market. Corporations, however, can also constitute a
176. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Easier Said than Done? A Corporate Law Theory for
Actualizing Social Responsibility Rhetoric, 59 FLA. L. REV. 771, 771 (2007) (“[C]orporate
rhetoric has a greater connection to corporate behaviour than most would presume.”).
177. BOON & LEVIN, supra note 1, at 120.
178. Interview with London law firm partner, supra note 54.
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form of governance, such as when they impose minimum labor or
environmental standards through their supply chains. As Ronen Shamir
notes, with CSR, what researchers are “witnessing is not merely a
transformation of the technologies of government but also an expansion and
transformation of the very means of governing.” 179 When corporate clients
start regulating OC conduct, they are exercising governance. OC
procedures also constitute an expansion and transformation of the means of
governing lawyers’ ethics. This process reallocates power between state,
markets, and civil society. It affects the regulation of the legal profession,
the lawyer-client relationship, and the structure of the legal services
field. 180
On the one hand, privatizing professionalism threatens the traditional
professional mode of self-regulation, and calls into question the core
professional value of lawyer independence. In addition, the notion that
corporate clients are determining the public responsibilities of private
lawyers is initially unsettling. Yet, the profession’s record of living up to
its own public aspirations has been questionable. What is emerging through
OC procedures appears to be a blurring of lines between different modes of
governance and the construction of a new interdependence among different
governance structures. But to the extent that professionalism has been
privatized, it arguably has also been revived and enhanced. While there
may be self interest in OC procedures, this frequently incorporates visions
of professionalism to which OC and their firms must adhere. We have seen
calls for lawyers to be “guardians of corporate ethical responsibility”; 181 we
did not expect to see corporations being guardians of lawyers’ ethical
responsibility. Yet privatizing professionalism appears to be the reality for
large corporate clients. It is therefore a form of regulation that needs to be
included in any future theories of lawyer professionalism.

179. Shamir, supra note 34, at 332.
180. Jonathan Beaverstock et al., The Long Arm of the Law: London’s Law Firms in a
Globalizing World Economy, 31 ENV’T & PLANNING A 1857 (1999); Jonathan Beaverstock,
et al., Geographies of Globalization: United States Law Firms in World Cities, 21 URB.
GEOGRAPHY 95, 95–120 (2000).
181. Colin Marks & Nancy B. Rapoport, The Corporate Lawyer’s Role in a
Contemporary Democracy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1293 (2009).

APPENDIX
Conflict of
interest and
confidentiality

Content

Comments

HFN commits to
notification if the
lawyer takes
official position
that may affect
client

HFN commits to nonpayment (bribery) of
government officials

Excerpt of contract referred by HFN, part of
U.S. legislation regarding bribery of public
officials

No

Yes

Includes workers and human rights, health
& safety, environment, and ethics

Not designed specifically for lawyers

“Litigation
Philosophy”: Cost
effectiveness;
maintaining “highest
ethical standards”

Yes

Confidentiality,
including the
Gramm-LeachBliley Act;
compliance with
SOX, regulation
regarding tax
shelters

Litigation: Coercive, dilatory, or
obstructive tactics not to be used;
discourages protracted motion practice;
early consideration of ADR and
settlements

Engagement of minorities & women as
Outside Counsel

Partnership
Guidelines for
Matter
Handling and
Billing
Practices for
Outside
Counsel

None

Yes

Confidentiality
and Conflicts
(lists competitors)

Extremely detailed supervision over legal
activities

Guidelines for
Outside
Counsel

None

Yes

Only cost-control
mechanisms

Although labeled as OC guideline, it refers
only to litigation management in terms of cost
reduction; no ethical reference

Corporation

Means of
oversight

General approach
to ethics

Anonymous
client

Contract with
Israeli law firm
HFN

No

Apple

Apple supplier
Code of
Conduct (2009)
(General code)

Yes, very broad

Bank of America

Outside
Counsel
Procedures

Boston Scientific
Corporation

Del Monte
Corporation

Billing

APPENDIX
Billing

Conflict of
interest and
confidentiality

Content

Comments

General eligibility
requirements

Prohibition of coercive practice, collusive
practice, corrupt practice, fraudulent
practice

There is a selection process for OC; no explicit
reference to lawyers as consultants; EBRD
confined by UN resolutions and cannot
transfer money if violates them; no mentioning
of ethics in considering selection of providers

None

Prefer negotiations, postpone sale if client
cooperative

Letter relates to trial counsel handling
foreclosure; FM retains full control of case
handing

N/A

Highest ethical standards in terms of
regulatory compliance, HR, labor,
environment, business ethics, IP, trade,
require honesty and fairness

May not use subcontracting and third parties to
evade duties; no explicit reference to lawyers

Corporation

Means of
oversight

General approach
to ethics

European Bank
for
Reconstruction &
Development

Procurement
Policy & Rules

Observance of the
highest standards of
transparency and
integrity

Fannie Mae

Engagement of
counsel letter

None

General Electric
(GE)

The Spirit &
the Letter;
Integrity Guide
for Suppliers,
Contractors and
Consultants

“Committed to
unyielding Integrity
and high standards of
business conduct in
everything we do,
especially
in our dealings with
GE suppliers,
contractors and
consultants”

Israeli Electronic
Co.

Outside
Counsel manual

Affirmative action
employer and
encourages OC to
adhere to such policies

Yes, cost
effectiveness
and
excellence to
be
reconciled.
Litigation to
be resolved
expeditiously
, using ADR.
Legal
motions &
discovery to
be reduced
as a cost
effective
strategy (not
philosophy)

Conflict of
interest

John Deere

Billing
guidelines for
OC

None

Yes

None

Yes

All reference to litigation strategies (ADR,
discovery, motions) as part of costs reduction
and efficiency considerations
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Corporation

Means of
oversight

General approach
to ethics

Billing

Maricopa County
Community
College District

Guidelines for
Outside
Counsel

MCCCD hires OC
based on firm’s
expertise and high
ethical standards

Yes

Multinational
beverage
Company

Guidelines for
Outside
Counsel
(June 1 2011)

OC must maintain the
highest ethical
standards at all times
and be in full
compliance with the
Company’s Code of
Conduct

Yes

Conflicts of
interest

Diversity: “The Company expects that all of its
vendors (including law firms) will leverage
diversity as a business imperative. To this end,
the Legal Division is committed to making
diversity a competitive advantage within our
organization by, among other things, ensuring
that our internal workforce and the outside
lawyers working on our matters reflect the
diverse community that is our consumer
base. . . . Law firm partners will also be
expected to provide periodic reporting . . .
evidencing progress in alignment to the
Company’s diversity goals.”

Stanford
University

Guidelines for
Stanford
Outside
Counsel

None

Yes, strict

None

Basic principles are costs and efficiency. No
reference to ethics, integrity, etc.

State of
Minnesota

Policy
Governing
Retention of
Outside
Counsel

Company requires
outside counsel to
comply with Rules of
Professional Conduct
and the highest ethical
standards

Yes

Conflict of
interest,
confidentiality

State of New
Jersey

Outside
Counsel
Guidelines
(2011)

OC expected to
represent State “with
integrity,
professionalism and a
sense of urgency”;
expects “the highest
ethical standards”

Yes, in detail

Conflicts of
interest,
confidentiality
(including
confidentiality
agreement), ADR

Coercive, delaying, or obstructive tactics
shall not be used

Relationship will be terminated if any OC fails
to adhere to the ethical standards
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Means of
oversight

General approach
to ethics

Billing

Conflict of
interest and
confidentiality

Content

Comments

The ExportImport Bank of
the United States

Guidelines for
Representation
of Ex-Im Bank
by Outside
International
Counsel in
Finance Matters
(April 2006)

Guidelines intended to
supplement any
professional or ethical
obligations applicable
to Firm’s professional
staff, including D.C.
Rules of Professional
Conduct

Yes

Conflict of
interest,
confidentiality

Universal
Underwriters
Group

Litigation Best
Practices for
Our Defense
Counsel

No

Yes, strict
oversight
and
instructions.

Yes, control over
handling litigation

Interrogatories and document requests:
standard forms are default. If counsel feels
that this is unnecessary, settlement is to be
considered and encouraged.

In general, quite combative

Wachovia
Corporation

General
Guidance for
Outside counsel

“Provide excellent
legal services in a
timely and costeffective manner
following the highest
ethical standards”

High quality, costeffective legal
services;
confidentiality
(including bank
privacy
legislation)

Ethics: “Wachovia is also committed to
conducting its business in accordance with
the highest ethical standards . . . If Outside
Counsel reasonably believes that a material
violation of law may have occurred, is
occurring or is about to occur at or
involving Wachovia, as set forth in Section
307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
and the SEC Rules promulgated thereunder
(see 17 CFR §205), Outside Counsel must
immediately and confidentially contact a
Deputy General Counsel or Wachovia’s
General Counsel and the responsible Legal
Division Lawyer.”

Matters relating to litigation proceedings
(discovery, depositions, pleading, etc.) are
referred to only in the context of in-house
supervision and approval; No mention of
litigation “policy” or “principles”

Failure to comply with the Guidelines may
result in termination and disqualification in the
future

Diversity: “Wachovia encourages the
retention of minorities and women by all
law firms providing legal services to
Wachovia. . . . Wachovia expects that
Outside Counsel will have professional
women and minorities work on its legal
matters. To monitor Outside Counsel’s
diversity commitment, Wachovia requests
Outside Counsel to submit certain
information regarding the use of women
and minorities, as well as other
relationship data to the extent available.”
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oversight

General approach
to ethics

Billing

Conflict of
interest and
confidentiality

Content

Comments

Walmart

Outside
Counsel
Guidelines

“Outside Counsel are
not just providers of
services but are vital
partners in our success.
It is critical that
Outside Counsel share
the commitment of the
Walmart Legal
Department to
providing the
Company with the
highest quality legal
services in the most
cost-effective manner
possible. We expect
Outside Counsel to
stress integrity,
professionalism. . . .”
General requirement
for “Ethical Conduct”
and reporting
requirements

Yes,
detailed.

Conflict of
interest;
confidentiality

Diversity: “We expect Outside Counsel to
make a good faith effort to recruit, retain,
and promote qualified women and
minorities . . .”

Detailed guidelines for litigation in general:
Early Case assessment and case management;
encouragement of early settlement resolution

The company “expects
to work with claims
defense counsel and its
customers to achieve
the best result for the
customer in an
efficient and costconscious manner
consistent with the law
firm’s ethical
obligations. Nothing
contained herein is
intended to nor shall
restrict counsel’s
exercise of
independent
professional judgment
in rendering legal
services for the insured
or otherwise interfere
with any ethical
directive . . . .”

Yes

Zurich Insurance

Guidelines for
Claims Defense
Counsel

Managing Litigation: the most detailed
expectations for ethical conduct relate to
adversary and court. “Honor the spirit,
intent, and requirements of all rules of civil
procedure and rules of professional
conduct; Conduct themselves in a manner
that enhances and preserves the dignity and
integrity of the system of justice; Adhere
to the principles and rules of conduct
which further the truth seeking process so
that disputes will be resolved in a just,
dignified, courteous and efficient manner;
Make reasonable responses to discovery.”

Description of
goal: “We seek to
achieve consistent
and efficient
processes yet also
to manage, not
merely process,
our cases. . .
Where there is no
defense to a claim
or where there is a
significant risk of
an adverse finding
against an
Insured, all efforts
should be made to
effect settlement
as early as
possible. . .”

Restrictions in cases where there is no defense
are versed as part of the policy to resolve cases
quickly rather than acting ethically

